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1.

INTRODUCTION

The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on the Choice of Court
Agreements sets forth uniform international rules for the
enforcement of “exclusive choice of court agreements concluded in
civil or commercial matters,” and for the recognition and
enforcement of judgments resulting from proceedings based on
such agreements.1 Mexico ratified the Convention in September
2007; the United States and the European Community became
signatories in early 2009.2
This treaty contains mandatory
standards that, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, preempt contrary state or federal law in cases where
the Convention applies.3
This Article examines the impact of the Convention on the
doctrines of forum non conveniens and transfer of venue in state
and federal courts in the United States, on the removal of actions
from state courts to federal courts, and on recognition of foreign
money judgments. Part II summarizes these doctrines as currently
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.
B.A., 1968,
University of Michigan; J.D., 1971, University of Wisconsin; LL.M., 1978, Harvard
University.
1 Hague Convention on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements art. 1, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
2 See id. arts. 1(1), 2(1), 8(1), 25 (establishing that a country that has ratified or
signed the Convention is referred to as a “Contracting State”). For updated
information on the status of the Convention, see Conference on Private
International Law Status Table, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act
=conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
3 See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text (listing the mandatory
standards included in the Convention and how they preempt contrary state and
federal law).
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followed by our courts in cases where the Hague Convention does
not apply. Part III provides an overview of the key provisions of
the Hague Convention. The impact of this Convention on the
domestic enforcement of forum selection clauses and on the
doctrines forum non conveniens, transfer of venue, removal, and
recognition of foreign judgments is examined in Part IV. The
Article concludes that although the Convention will not require a
wholesale revision of these doctrines, it will preempt state and
federal laws in some significant areas.
2.

DOCTRINES FOLLOWED IN COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES IN
CASES WHERE THE HAGUE CONVENTION DOES NOT APPLY

2.1. Forum Selection Clauses (Choice of Court Agreements)
The vast majority of courts in the United States will enforce a
choice of court agreement, often referred to as a “forum selection
clause,” unless the resisting party shows that enforcement would
be unreasonable and unjust.4 Enforcement will be denied only
when the agreement is invalid based on contract formation
principles, such as fraud, duress, or unequal bargaining power; is
contrary to the public policy of the forum; or designates a forum
that is so gravely inconvenient that it will effectively deprive a
party of a meaningful day in court.5 However, a few states treat

4 See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 361, 366–72 (1993)
(noting that every federal circuit and the vast majority of states enforce a valid
and reasonable forum selection clause); 1 ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B.
RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS §§ 1–7 & 3–1[5][c][iv] (3d ed. 1998 & 2008
Supp.) (providing a collection of cases involving prorogation agreements); M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (holding that forum
selection clauses in commercial contracts are prima facie valid and enforceable
unless unreasonable); Prof’l Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 350 n.3 (Ala.
1997) (collecting cases where courts re-evaluated their positions on forum
selection clauses); Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 551 P.2d 1206,
1209 (Cal. 1976) (holding choice of court agreement will be given effect unless it is
unfair and unreasonable).
5 See, e.g., Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12–19 (mentioning a number of situations where
forum selection clauses would not be enforced); Smith, 551 P.2d at 1208–09
(discussing the public policy cause for not enforcing a forum selection clause); see
also Heiser, supra note 4, at 370–71 (discussing various standards for enforcement
of forum selection clauses); CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 4, § 3-1[5][c][iv]
(collecting cases discussing prorogation agreements). Most courts view a forum
selection clause as waiving any possible objection to the contractually designated
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forum selection clauses less favorably.6 Some impose additional
prerequisites to enforcement, such as that there be a rational basis
for the party’s forum choice; others flatly refuse to enforce forum
selection clauses in certain cases.7
A forum selection clause may be either exclusive (often referred
to as “mandatory”) or nonexclusive (“permissive”). An exclusive
agreement requires that litigation be commenced only in the
contractually designated forum. In contrast, a nonexclusive
agreement authorizes litigation in a designated forum, but does not
prohibit litigation elsewhere. The determination of whether a
particular agreement is exclusive or nonexclusive depends on the
intent of the parties, which in turn requires an interpretation of the
language of the agreement.8
There does not appear to be a uniform approach to this
important determination.9 Some courts are reluctant to find that a
forum selection clause is exclusive, requiring an agreement that
designates one forum to also contain specific language that clearly
excludes jurisdiction elsewhere.10 For example, one lower court
concluded the clause, “Place of jurisdiction shall be Dresden” in an
international commercial contract was permissive because it only
specified jurisdiction and no other language indicated the parties’
forum’s lack of personal jurisdiction. See Heiser, supra note 4, at 378–93
(discussing the waivable nature of a defendant’s personal jurisdiction right).
6 See Heiser, supra note 4, at 371–72; CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 4, § 1–7,
n.203 (collecting cases where both federal and state courts have enforced
prorogation agreements so long as they are just and reasonable).
7 E.g., Jetbroadband WV, LLC v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 13 So. 3d 159, 161–62
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing Florida’s restrictions on enforcement of
forum selection clauses); Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1244
(Mont. 1998) (voiding forum selection clause because Montana statute protects
Montana residents from having to litigate outside of Montana); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
22B-3 (2009) (declaring certain forum selection clauses void and unenforceable).
8 See cases cited infra notes 10–15 (applying various approaches to
interpretation of exclusivity of forum selection clauses).
9 See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS, 446–60 (4th ed. Aspen Pub. 2007) (discussing various
approaches to the enforceability of international forum selection agreements).
10 E.g., K & V Scientific Co. v. BMW, 314 F.3d 494, 499 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing
cases where courts consider the exclusiveness of forum selection clauses); John
Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki Imps. & Distribs. Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 52
(2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a forum selection clause was not mandatory because it
did not contain language making it so); Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch
Maschinen, 972 F.2d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[W]here venue is specified with
mandatory or obligatory language, the clause will be enforced; where only
jurisdiction is specified, the clause will generally not be enforced . . . .”).
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intent to make venue exclusive.11 Moreover, if a clause is
ambiguous, i.e., capable of being construed as either permissive or
mandatory, the clause will be construed against the drafter.12
Other courts apply more neutral principles of contract
interpretation. A forum selection clause will be deemed exclusive
if the forum is designated with mandatory language.13 Under this
approach, a clause knowingly incorporated into a contract should
not be treated as “meaningless and redundant” by ignoring the
likely reason for its existence.14 Moreover, a clause will be deemed
exclusive where the agreement as a whole evinces this intent,
despite the absence of typical mandatory terms such as “shall,”
“only,” or “must.”15
2.2. The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a
trial court to dismiss an action where an alternative forum is
available in another country and that forum is substantially more
convenient for the parties, the witnesses, or the court.16 The

11 Hull 753 Corp. v. Elbe Flugzeugwerke GmbH, 58 F. Supp. 2d 925, 927
(N.D. Ill. 1999).
12 See K & V Scientific, 314 F.3d at 500–01 (citing cases from various federal
circuits that have held this interpretation).
13 E.g., Sterling Forest Assocs., Ltd. v. Barnett-Range Corp., 840 F.2d 249, 251–
52 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the language “shall be” created a mandatory
forum selection clause); General Electric Co. v. G. Siempelkamp & Co., 29 F.3d
1095, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the language “all” and “shall” was
mandatory).
14 Sterling Forest, 840 F.2d at 251.
15 E.g., Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 17–18 & n.5 (1st
Cir. 2009) (holding a forum selection clause was mandatory based on context of
the contract and not specific words); Furry v. First Nat’l Monetary Corp., 602 F.
Supp. 6, 9 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding that a forum selection clause is mandatory
based on context and intent of parties, without specific words making it
mandatory).
16 E.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 261 (1981) (granting a forum
non conveniens motion); Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991)
(concluding that California was an inconvenient forum). Much of this general
discussion of forum non conveniens has been stated elsewhere. See Walter W.
Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the Available
Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non Conveniens as a
Defense Tactic, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 609, 611–18 (2008) [hereinafter Heiser, Forum Non
Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation] (examining the impact of retaliatory
legislation on the use of forum non conveniens); Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non
Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying Foreign Law in Transnational
Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1165–68 (2005) [hereinafter Heiser, Forum Non
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doctrine varies somewhat from state to state, but most jurisdictions
have adopted an approach similar to that set forth by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert17 and Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno.18 A defendant filing a forum non conveniens motion seeks
dismissal of the action not because the chosen forum lacks
jurisdiction—most transnational actions are filed in the state where
the defendant resides—but because there is an alternative forum in
another country which also has jurisdiction and, in addition, is far
more convenient.19
In assessing whether a forum non conveniens dismissal is
appropriate, a court must first determine whether an adequate
alternative forum is available.20 Generally, a forum is considered
adequate and available if the defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction there and no other procedural bar, such as the statute
of limitations, prevents resolution of the merits in the alternative
forum.21 The possibility of an unfavorable change in substantive or
Conveniens and Choice of Law] (detailing how forum non conveniens operates to
protect U.S. companies).
17 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Gilbert dealt with the federal
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens in federal courts. Most states, by
statute or by case law, have incorporated Gilbert’s private and public interest
factors into their forum non conveniens doctrine. See Heiser, supra note 4, at 395
n.198 (citing authorities detailing the incorporation of Gilbert’s factors); CASAD &
RICHMAN, supra note 4, § 1-4 (collecting cases regarding forum non conveniens
disputes); Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens
Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 315–16 & nn.17–18 (2002) (collecting cases using
Gilbert’s private and public interest factors); David W. Robertson & Paula K.
Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non
Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 948–53 & nn.68–88 (1990)
(collecting authorities regarding the incorporation of Gilbert).
18 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 235. See authorities cited supra note 16 (citing
sources that offer a general discussion of forum non conveniens).
19 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506–09. See also Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 256 (“The
central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is
convenient.”).
20 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255 n.22; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17.
The
“adequate alternative forum” prerequisite rarely prevents a U.S. court from
granting a forum non conveniens motion. See Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and
Retaliatory Legislation, supra note 16, at 614–18 (“Only where… specifically proven
to be corrupt or biased and incapable of acting impartially… will a court find an
alternative forum inadequate.”); Megan Waples, The Adequate Alternative Forum
Analysis in Forum Non Conveniens: A Case for Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1475, 1501
(2004) (reviewing cases and concluding foreign plaintiffs have very little success
defeating a forum non conveniens motion on the basis of the adequacy of the
alternative forum).
21 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255 n.22; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 18. Defendants
routinely stipulate that they will waive any objections to the alternative forum
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procedural law is ordinarily not a consideration relevant to the
forum non conveniens analysis, unless the remedy provided by the
alternative forum is “so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it
is no remedy at all.”22
If a court determines that an adequate alternative forum is
available, the court must then balance a variety of private and
public interests associated with the litigation. As identified in
Gilbert, the factors pertaining to the private interests of the litigants
include “the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability
of compulsory process for attendance of willing witnesses;
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the
action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case
easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”23
The public interest factors identified in Gilbert include the
administrative difficulties for courts “when litigation is piled up in
congested centers instead of being handled at its origin,” the “local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home,” the
interest in having the trial in a forum that is at home with the law
that must govern the action, the burden of jury duty imposed upon
the citizens of a community which has no relation to the litigation,
and the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflicts of law or in
the application of unfamiliar foreign law.24 These public and
private interest factors are to be applied flexibly by the courts,
without giving undue emphasis to any one element.25 The
balancing of these various factors, as well as the ultimate

based on personal jurisdiction or statute of limitations, and trial courts typically
make such waivers a condition of the forum non conveniens dismissal, rendering
these considerations non-factors. See Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of
Law, supra note 16, at 1171 (discussing cases involving waivers).
22 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 19 n.5 (pointing out
uncertainty in the language used in Piper Aircraft Co.). The “no remedy at all”
component of the “adequate alternative forum” inquiry rarely precludes forum
non conveniens dismissals in transnational cases. See Heiser, Forum Non
Conveniens and Choice of Law, supra note 16, at 1172–74 (discussing cases proving
the “no remedy at all” inquiry rarely precludes dismissal).
23 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
24 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09; accord Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241 n.6
(quoting Gilbert).
25 E.g., Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 249–50 (stressing the need for flexibility);
Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 18–19 (protecting the flexibility of the doctrine).
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determination of whether to grant or deny the forum non
conveniens motion, is typically left to the trial court’s discretion.26
Where the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state, there is
ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s choice of
forum, which may be overcome only when the private and public
interest factors clearly point towards trial in the alternative
forum.27 However, this presumption disappears when the plaintiff
is a resident of a foreign country.28 A nonresident plaintiff’s choice
of forum is accorded little deference because that choice is viewed
as based on choice-of-law considerations, not on convenience.29
Consequently, a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a United States forum
rarely is a significant factor in favor of retaining jurisdiction.30
2.3. Forum Selection Clauses and Forum Non Conveniens
Courts sometimes confront an issue involving the relationship
between forum selection clauses and the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. This arises when a plaintiff files an action in the court
designated as the exclusive forum in a choice of court agreement,
but the defendant nevertheless seeks dismissal based on forum non
conveniens. The contractually designated court must decide
whether the existence of a choice of court agreement precludes
granting the forum non conveniens motion.
In several instances, courts have determined that an exclusive
choice of forum agreement does not preclude the court from
granting a forum non conveniens motion, even though the effect is
dismissal of the case from the contractually mandated forum.31
26 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 257. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09 (discussing
the factors to be balanced); Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17 (addressing the court’s role in
balancing the factors).
27 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255.
28 Id. at 256; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 20.
29 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 251–52. See Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp.,
274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (ruling that “the more it appears that the
plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. forum was motivated by forum-shopping reasons. . . the
less deference the plaintiff’s choice commands”).
30 E.g., Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255–56 (asserting that the presumption of
deference for plaintiff’s choice of forum is weakened when the plaintiff is foreign);
Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 20 (asserting that deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum
only happens when the forum chosen is the plaintiff’s state of residence).
31 E.g., Life of Am. Ins. Co. v. Baker-Lowe-Fox Ins. Mktg., Inc., 873 S.W.2d
537, 540 (Ark. 1994) (affirming a forum non conveniens dismissal despite an
agreement mandating an Arkansas forum); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 555 N.E.2d 214, 218–19 (Mass. 1990) (commenting that a

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

1020

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:4

According to these courts, a forum agreement removes only the
parties’ private convenience interests from consideration, but not
the various other private and public interests relevant in the forum
non conveniens analysis.32
The parties have no power to
contractually waive the various public interest factors or the
private ones of third parties, such as the convenience of witnesses,
jurors, judges, and the judicial system.33 Consequently, in cases
where the Hague Convention does not apply, the existence of an
exclusive choice of court agreement may not preclude a forum non
conveniens dismissal.34
2.4. Forum Selection Clauses and Section 1404(a) Motions to Transfer
Venue in Federal Courts
Section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides:
“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
forum selection clause cannot bar the use of forum non conveniens because it
involves public as well as private interests); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 627, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that various public
interest factors cannot be automatically outweighed by the existence of a purely
private agreement); Sarieddine v. Moussa, 820 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. App. 1991)
(holding as well that various public interest factors cannot be automatically
outweighed by the existence of a purely private agreement); Package Express Cr.,
Inc. v. Snider Foods, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 561, 564–65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming
a forum non conveniens dismissal despite the existence of a mandatory forum
selection clause designating a Tennessee court).
32 See cases cited supra note 31 (listing courts which have determined that an
exclusive choice of forum agreement does not preclude the court from granting a
forum non conveniens motion, even though the effect is dismissal of the case from
the contractually mandated forum).
33 Id. See also Heiser, supra note 4, at 394–401 (explaining why the public
interest factors and some of the private interest factors are not subject to
contractual waiver).
34 See cases cited supra note 31 (citing cases in which courts have granted a
forum non conveniens motion, even though the effect is dismissal of the case from
the contractually mandated forum). Of course, a permissive or non-exclusive
choice of court agreement will have little effect on a court’s willingness to grant a
forum non conveniens dismissal. E.g., Blanco v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela,
997 F.2d 974, 979–80 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting use of the heightened Bremen
standard used in mandatory forum provision cases because of the permissive
forum provision); Brooke Group Ltd. v. JCH Syndicate 488, 663 N.E.2d 635, 638
(N.Y. 1996) (stating that the service of suit clause does not mandate the forum,
thereby allowing for dismissal on conveniens grounds); Berg v. MTC Elec. Techs.
Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 523, 528–29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (demonstrating the lower
standard of review for permissive forum clauses relative to the high standard of
“unfair of unreasonable” for mandatory forum clauses).
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district or division where it might have been brought.”35 Section
1404(a) is a codification and revision of the common law forum
non conveniens doctrine set forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.36
However, unlike forum non conveniens, which applies in federal
courts where the alternative forum is in another country, section
1404(a) applies when a party or the court seeks transfer of venue
from one federal district court to another.37 A federal court can
order transfer under section 1404(a) on a lesser showing of
inconvenience than is necessary for dismissal, and can exercise
broader discretion than would be permitted under the common
law forum non conveniens doctrine.38
In Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp.,39 the Supreme Court
clarified the relationship between a forum selection clause and a
section 1404(a) motion to transfer venue. The Court ruled that the
existence of an exclusive forum selection clause does not preclude
a federal district court in the contractually designated location
from transferring the lawsuit to a federal district court in another
state.40 The Court reasoned that section 1404(a) is intended to give
the district court discretion to adjudicate motions for transfer based
on an “individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience
and fairness.”41 As to the weight accorded a forum selection
clause, the Court simply noted that flexible and individualized
analysis under section 1404(a) encompasses “consideration of the
parties’ private expression of their venue preferences.”42 A forum
selection clause “should receive neither dispositive consideration
nor no consideration” the Court ruled, “but rather the
consideration for which Congress provided in § 1404(a).”43
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the private
and public interest factors relevant under the Gilbert court’s forum non
conveniens analysis.
37 See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2 (1994) (noting
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens in federal court applies only where the
alternative forum is in another country).
38 See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) (finding that Congress
intended to allow courts to “grant transfers upon a lower showing of
inconvenience”).
39 Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
40 See id. at 28–31 (“The forum-selection clause. . . should receive neither
dispositive consideration. . . nor no consideration . . . .”)
41 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964).
42 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30.
43 Id. at 31.
35
36

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

1022

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:4

As with forum non conveniens, a section 1404(a) transfer
motion requires a trial court to consider a variety of public interest
factors pursuant to the statutory directive that the transfer be “in
the interest of justice.”44 These public interest factors cannot be
waived by private parties in a contract, and must be taken into
account by a court despite the existence of a mandatory forum
selection clause.45
“Likewise, some private interest factors,
particularly the convenience of certain independent witnesses in
limited circumstances, may be beyond party control and be
considered regardless of a forum selection clause.”46 Several lower
federal court decisions have adopted this reasoning, granting
section 1404(a) transfers of venue despite exclusive choice of court
agreements.47
2.5. Forum Selection Clauses and Removal Jurisdiction
Pursuant to section 1441 of Title 28 of the United States Code, a
defendant may remove a case initiated in state court to the federal
district court sitting in the place where such action is pending.48
44 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30-31. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 529–
30 (1990) (observing that courts should consider the interests of witnesses and the
court as well as the convenience of parties when evaluating § 1404(a) motions);
Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 375 U.S. 71, 72–73 (1963) (noting that a §
1404(a) transfer motion and a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens involve
similar, but not identical, criteria).
45 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30 (Section 1404(a) directs a district court to “take
account of factors other than those that bear solely on the parties’ private ordering
of their affairs”); Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts:
Limitations on Enforcement after Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 553, 571–
74 (1993) (discussing how courts must take into account many public interest
factors in order to ensure that the transfer comports with the purpose of §
1404(a)).
46 Heiser, supra note 45, at 572; see Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30–31 (noting that
analysis under § 1404(a) includes “consideration of the parties’ private expression
of the venue preferences”).
47 E.g., APA Excelsior III v. Premiere Tech., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 664, 671–73
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (approving transfer of venue despite forum selection clause);
McNic Oil & Gas Co. v. Ibex Res. Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 729, 737– (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(approving transfer of venue despite Michigan forum selection clauses); Standard
Office Sys. of Fort Smith, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 742 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Ark. 1990)
(denying transfer to New York of venue despite forum selection clause in sales
agreement); see CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 4, at 54 n.207 (listing cases where
transfers to a chosen forum were denied and those where transfers from a chosen
forum were allowed); Heiser, supra note 45, at 573–74 n.94 (discussing a survey of
forty-four district court decisions applying Stewart to forum selection clauses in §
1404(a) transfer motions).
48 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)–(d) (2006).
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Removal is authorized only when the United States District Court
has original subject matter jurisdiction over the action, except in
actions founded on diversity of citizenship, which are removable
only if none of the defendants is a citizen of the state in which the
action is brought.49 Procedurally, when a defendant files a petition
for removal in the federal court, the case is removed automatically
from state court.50 If the plaintiff wishes to challenge the propriety
of removal, he must then file a motion to remand the case back to
state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447.51
Some forum selection clauses designate a specific state court as
the exclusive forum to adjudicate contract-related disputes.
Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have considered whether to enforce
such a contractual provision and remand the action back to state
court. All have decided to enforce forum selection clauses that
specify adjudication in state, rather than federal, court.52 These
courts view the right to removal as a waivable statutory right—a
right the defendant can waive in advance by contract.53 Therefore,
generally, a carefully drafted choice of court agreement that

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)–(b) (2006).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2006) (governing the procedure for removal from a
state court).
51 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2006).
52 E.g., Yakin v. Tyler Hill Corp., 566 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming
district court’s remand of personal injury suit to state court based on forum
selection clause), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 401 (2009); American Soda, LLP v. U.S.
Filter Wastewater Group, Inc., 428 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming district
court’s remand of breach of contract suit to state court based on forum selection
clause); Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 2001)
(holding that defendant in insurance coverage dispute had waived ability to
consent to removal by including service of suit clause in policy); Roberts &
Schaefer Co. v. Merit Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 248 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding
forum selection clause specifying state court forum in breach of contract suit);
Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1214 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
forum selection clause waived reinsurer’s right to remove suit originally filed in
state court); City of Rose City v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 13, 16 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding that defendant in insurance coverage dispute had waived ability to seek
removal by including service of suit clause in policy). But see Morgan v. Nat’l
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 900 F.2d 890, 894 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that inclusion
of forum selection clause in contract did not constitute waiver of right to seek
removal where party seeking removal was agency or instrumentality of foreign
state within the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
53 See cases cited supra note 52 (citing circuit court cases where the court has
affirmed the removal of cases specifying state court venue).
49
50
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designates a state court as the exclusive forum will preclude a
lawsuit from being heard in federal court.54
2.6. Recognition of Foreign Judgments and Forum Selection Clauses
2.6.1.

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Generally

As often noted, there is no international Full Faith and Credit
Clause.55 Consequently, each country is free to adopt whatever
standards for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments it
deems appropriate.56
Beginning in the late 19th century,
jurisdictions in the United States generally recognized foreign
judgments on grounds of comity.57 Prior to the decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,58 the standards for recognition by federal
courts were based on federal common law.59 “After Erie, unless a
treaty or federal statute applies, the relevant standards are matters

54 A possible exception to this general rule is a lawsuit removed to federal
court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2006). See
Morgan, 900 F.2d at 893 (noting that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
provides a foreign state absolute right of removal to federal courts by a foreign
state to resolve sovereign immunity issues).
55 See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the
United States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 253, 258–65 (1991) (discussing the recognition of foreign judgments in United
States federal courts); Katherine R. Miller, Playground Politics: Assessing the Wisdom
of Writing a Reciprocity Requirement into U.S. International Recognition and
Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 239, 243–44 (2004) (stating that the recognition
of foreign judgments is not required by the text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
nor does such recognition fit within the clause’s original purpose); Linda J.
Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice on International
Business Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 327, 352 (2004) (noting
that the United States’ Full Faith and Credit Clause does not address foreign
judgments).
56 Much of this general discussion of recognition of foreign money judgments
has been stated elsewhere. See Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory
Legislation, supra note 16, at 634–38 (discussing the recognition of foreign
judgments in the United States and particularly under the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act).
57 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (providing a discussion on
the principle of comity in order to support the court’s use of the principle); Brand,
supra note 55, at 258–62 (discussing the application of the comity principle in
American courts).
58 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
59 See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163 (relying on the federal common law principle of
comity rather than a state law).
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for state law.”60 Because no comprehensive treaty or federal
statute currently exists, recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments is now governed by state law.61
A majority of states has enacted a highly influential model law,
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962
(UFMJRA)62 or its 2005 revision, the Uniform Foreign-Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act.63 Many of the remaining states
have adopted the standards of the UFMJRA or of the substantially
similar Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, as their
common law doctrine.64 “As a result, even though state law
governs, the grounds for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments are nearly the same in any court in the United States.”65
Therefore, for purposes of analysis, this Article will treat the
provisions of the UFMJRA as setting forth the relevant standards

60 Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation, supra note 16, at
634; see also Brand, supra note 55, at 262–68 (discussing state rules with regard to
foreign judgments and complications that federal courts incur in applying state
rules); Miller, supra note 55, at 251 (stating that after the Erie decision, federal
courts have agreed that state law governs the question of recognition of foreign
judgments).
61 Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation, supra note 16, at
634.
62 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 39 (2002)
[hereinafter UFMJRA]. To date, 30 states have enacted the UFMJRA. Id.
63 UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (U.L.A.)
(Supp. 2008). For the most part, the 2005 Uniform Act is a clarification of the
standards set forth in the earlier UFMJRA. To date, 3 states have enacted the 2005
Uniform Act. Id. at 5.
64 E.g., Society of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 999 (10th Cir. 2005)
(applying Utah’s common law principles of comity, where Utah has not adopted
the UFMJRA); Alberta Sec. Com’n v. Ryckman, 30 P.3d 121, 126–27 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2001) (applying the Restatement as Arizona’s common law recognition doctrine);
Petition of Breau, 565 A.2d 1044, 1049–50 (N.H. 1989) (relying on the Restatement
to determine recognition of foreign judgment); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481–82 (1987) (discussing cases that apply §§ 481–82);
Brand, supra note 55, at 265–83 (comparing the UFMJRA’s and the Restatement’s
recognition standards).
65 Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation, supra note 16, at
635. Pursuant to the command of Erie, a federal court must also apply state law
when determining whether to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment. E.g.,
McCord v. Jet Spray Int’l Corp., 874 F. Supp. 436, 438 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1994) (noting
that a majority of cases hold that “federal courts should use state law in
determining the preclusive effect of foreign judgments”); Resolution Trust Corp.
v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that in the absence of a
federal statute, a court will utilize the procedure of a state court in proceedings to
execute a federal judgment).
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with respect to whether a court in the United States will enforce a
foreign money judgment.66
The UFMJRA “applies to any foreign judgment for [money
damages] that is final and conclusive and enforceable where
rendered . . . .”67 Under the UFMJRA, such a foreign judgment “is
enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state
which is entitled to full faith and credit,” unless one the UFMJRA’s
grounds for nonrecognition applies.68 The references here to
“sister state” judgments and “full faith and credit” are significant
because they incorporate an important aspect of enforcement of
sister state judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution, i.e., that the enforcing court can not
review the merits of an otherwise valid judgment rendered in
another state.69
2.6.2.

Mandatory Grounds for Nonrecognition of Foreign
Judgments

Two grounds for mandatory nonrecognition of a foreign
judgment under the UFMJRA are that the foreign court lacked
personal jurisdiction or lacked subject matter jurisdiction.70 The
UFMJRA contains a non-exclusive list of the proper bases for the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant by the foreign
court, generally tracking the Supreme Court’s various holdings
under the Due Process Clause.71 One specified basis is where “the
defendant prior to the commencement of the proceedings had
agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with
respect to the subject matter involved.”72
In other words,
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment cannot be

66 However, the 2005 version of the Uniform Act does contain some
additional grounds for nonrecognition of foreign judgments not specified in the
1962 Act. These new grounds will be discussed in this Article where relevant. See
infra text accompanying notes 92–93 (discussing grounds for nonrecognition
introduced in the 2005 version).
67 UFMJRA § 2; 13 U.L.A. 46 (2002).
68 Id. § 3.
69 See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (stating that the merits of a
judgment given in another state cannot be reviewed by an enforcing court).
70 UFMJRA § 4(a)(2)–(3).
71 Id. § 5.
72 Id. § 5(a)(3).
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refused for lack of personal jurisdiction if the litigation proceeded
in the foreign court pursuant to a valid forum selection clause.73
The third and final mandatory ground for nonrecognition
under the UFMJRA is that “the judgment was rendered under a
system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process of law.”74 Most
courts interpret this reference to “due process” to mean that the
foreign procedures must only be “fundamentally fair” and not
offend against “basic fairness.”75 This mandatory basis for
nonrecognition does not mean that a foreign country’s procedures
must incorporate all the specific due process requirements
reflected in procedures in United States courts.76
Foreign
73 E.g., Genujo Lok Beteiligungs GMBH v. Zorn, 943 A.2d 573, 580 (Me. 2008)
(finding that the forum selection clause provided a foreign court the authority to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the parties).
74 UFMJRA § 4(a)(1); 13 U.L.A. 59 (2002). With respect to the question of
impartiality, the appropriate inquiry is whether the judicial system is an
independent branch of the foreign country’s government and is capable of
administering, and does in fact administer justice in a fair manner. See S.C.
Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enter., Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(finding Romanian court systems provided impartial tribunals in compliance with
the due process requirements). Only where a foreign tribunal is specifically
proven to be corrupt or biased and incapable of acting impartially with respect to
the defendant, should a United States court find that the foreign legal system
lacks impartiality. See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 137–38,
142–44 (2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to enforce a Liberian judgment because the court
found that Liberia’s judicial system was in disarray); Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi,
58 F.3d 1406, 1410–1413 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to enforce Iranian judgment
against the sister of the Shah of Iran because after the Shah was deposed, the
Iranian judicial system did not provide her with fair treatment or basic due
process).
75 E.g., Soc’y Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (referring
to the American concept of due process as “complex”); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Turner,
303 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[F]oreign proceedings need not comply with the
traditional rigors of American due process . . .”). Some courts even call this the
“international concept of due process” to distinguish it from the complex
understanding of due process that has emerged in the United States courts. E.g.,
Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477 (interpreting that the due process in the Illinois Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act refers to the concept of fair procedure);
Soc’y of Lloyds v. Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d 632, 641 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (“International
due process is a more flexible approach . . .”); see Montré D. Carodine, Political
Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1162
(2007) (examining the “extent to which [U.S.] courts should apply American
notions of due process in determining whether to recognize and enforce
judgments obtained abroad.”).
76 According to the drafters of the UFMJRA, “a mere difference in the
procedural system is not a sufficient basis for nonrecognition. A case of serious
injustice must be involved.” UFMJRA § 4 cmt., 13 U.L.A. 59 (2002). See Ingersoll
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judgments have been enforced, for example, even though the
foreign procedure did not include the right to cross-examine
witnesses,77 prohibited the defendant from raising certain defenses
and counterclaims,78 prohibited discovery as to the amount
claimed by the plaintiff,79 or lacked a verbatim transcript.80 Also,
this basis for nonrecognition apparently refers only to the
requirements of procedural, not substantive, rights.81 The only
substantive basis that the UFMJRA recognizes for non-enforcement

Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the
UFMJRA does not require that the procedures employed by a foreign tribunal be
identical to those employed in American courts); Brand, supra note 55, at 271
(“Where personal jurisdiction exists, procedures different from those in the
United States enforcing court will not generally rise to the level of a violation of
due process in the [enforcing] of a foreign judgment.”); see also sources cited supra
note 75.
77 E.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 139, 139 (1895) (finding that “[a] foreign
judgment cannot be impeached because one of the plaintiffs was permitted to
testify without being put under oath, and was not subjected to cross-examination .
. . .”); Panama Servs. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276, 285–86 (Okla. 1990)
(observing that Panama’s argument did not rest on failure to receive “full and fair
notice or that it was not given the opportunity to be heard in the Brazilian court”
and thus a violation of due process, but rather it focused on the procedural
difference); Ingersoll, 833 F.2d at 686–88 (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim that his
waiver of his right to cross-examination equated to less than a “full and fair
opportunity to present his claims”).
78 See, e.g., Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 479–80 (“The rationale for the conclusiveevidence clause, and for the denial of full discovery regarding the accuracy of the
assessment, is similar to the rationale for the pay now sue later clause.”); Soc’y of
Lloyd’s v. Mullin, 255 F. Supp. 2d 468, 472 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (defendant objected to
the foreign court’s enforcement of a “pay-now-sue-later” clause, which prohibited
defendant from raising certain defenses and counterclaims during the foreign
action).
79 See, e.g., Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 480 (“[P]retrial discovery is not a part of the
U.S. concept of due process.”); Panama Servs., 796 P.2d at 286 (observing that
Panama’s argument was based on procedural differences – differences that are not
violations of due process.).
80 See British Midland Airways, Ltd. v. Int’l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th
Cir. 1974) (finding that an American corporation which agreed to be bound by
foreign law when it entered into contract with a British company was not denied
due process by action of foreign courts where it was American corporation’s
“choice not to pursue the matter on appeal or take advantage of the conditional
defense allowance”); Tonga Air Servs. v. Fowler, 826 P.2d 204, 212 (Wash. 1992)
(en banc) (noting that the absence of a verbatim transcript of the proceedings does
not violate due process).
81 See Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 480 (observing that “the cases that deal with
international due process” speak only of procedural rights).
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of a foreign judgment is that the judgment is repugnant to the
public policy of the enforcing state.82
2.6.3.

Discretionary Grounds for Nonrecognition of Foreign
Judgments

The UFMJRA also specifies several discretionary grounds for
nonrecognition. For example, a foreign judgment need not be
recognized where the defendant did not receive proper notice of
the foreign court proceeding, the judgment was obtained by fraud
or it conflicts with another final judgment, or where the proceeding
in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement to litigate the
dispute in another court.83
Another discretionary ground for nonrecognition under the
UFMJRA is that the “cause of action” on which the judgment is
based is “repugnant to the public policy” of the state in which the
enforcing court sits.84 Although this public policy exception defies
easy interpretation, most courts give it a very narrow
construction.85 This exception operates only in those unusual cases
where the foreign judgment is “repugnant to fundamental notions
of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is
sought.”86 Because the focus is on the “cause of action,” some

82 Id. The “public policy” exception to recognition is discussed infra in the
text accompanying notes 84–91.
83 UFMJRA §§ 4(b)(1)–(2), (4), & (5), 13 U.L.A. 46 (2002).
84 UFMJRA § 4(b)(3).
85 See, e.g., Southwest Livestock and Trucking Co. v. Ramón, 169 F.3d 317, 321
(5th Cir. 1999) (noting the narrowness of the public policy exception and that the
level of contravention of forum law must be high); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d
830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986) (observing that the standard to satisfy the public policy
exception is high and infrequently met); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Mullin, 255 F. Supp.
2d 468, 475 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (reviewing cases and adopting a “high standard” with
respect to the scope of the public policy exception), aff’d, 96 Fed. Appx. 100 (3d
Cir. 2004). See also Brand, supra note 55, at 275–76 (noting that the public policy
exception seldom has led to denial of enforcement); Silberman, supra note 55, at
356–59 (noting that outside of the First Amendment area, the public policy
exception has not posed a significant barrier to enforcement of foreign
judgments).
86 Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 841 (quoting Tahan v. Hodgeson, 662 F.2d 862, 864
(D.C. Cir. 1981)). One classic formulation is that a judgment is contrary to the
public policy of the enforcing state where that judgment “tends clearly to
undermine the public interest, the public confidence in the administration of the
law, or security for individual rights of personal liberty or of private property.”
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir.
1971).
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courts have concluded that the proper inquiry is whether the
substantive law applied in the foreign forum is contrary to public
policy.87 However, the fact that the judgment offends the
enforcement state’s public policy does not, in and of itself, permit
the court to refuse recognition of that judgment.88
Relying on the public policy exception, United States courts
have refused to enforce foreign libel judgments where the foreign
libel law was repugnant to the free speech values of the First
Amendment.89 However, when the values involved are less
fundamental than the constitutional right of free speech, courts
usually enforce foreign judgments, even though the foreign cause
of action reflects a policy judgment contrary to that of the
corresponding domestic law.90 For example, United States courts
87 See Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Siemon-Netto, 457 F.3d 94, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(recounting that Section 15-383(b)(3) of the Recognition Act permits
nonrecognition of foreign judgments only if the cause of action is repugnant to
public policy); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 995 (10th Cir. 2005)
(reiterating that the Court must focus on the cause of action); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v.
Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2002) (reiterating that, by the “plain language of
the Texas Recognition Act,” the cause of action underlying a judgment must be
contrary to public policy before nonrecognition of that judgment is allowed);
Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 480 (“The only substantive basis . . . for not enforcing a
foreign judgment is that ‘the cause of action on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy’. . . .”).
88 Ramon, 169 F.3d at 321. See also cases cited supra note 87, which note that
where the foreign judgment was not found to offend public policy the court may
not refuse recognition of that judgment. But see the recent revision to § 4(c)(3) of
the UFMJRA discussed infra in text accompanying note 93, which provides for
nonrecognition of judgments that offend public policy.
89 See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’anti-semitisme, 169
F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that French court order requiring ISP

to block French citizens’ access to Nazi material on ISP’s United States site
was unenforceable in the United States as it threatened the First Amendment),

rev’d on other grounds, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). See generally
Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (showing refusal of U.S.
courts to enforce British libel judgment that was contrary to First Amendment
values); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997) (confirming the
holding from Matusevitch v. Telnikoff on same grounds); Bachchan v. India
Abroad Publ’ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (showing refusal of
U.S. court to enforce a British libel judgment that it found offensive to the First
Amendment).
90 See, e.g., Turner, 303 F.3d at 332–33 (ruling that the public policy exception
is not triggered “simply because the body of foreign law upon which the
judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign
law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum” quoting
Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Tex. 1980)); Ackermann,
788 F.2d at 843 (“It is not enough merely that a foreign judgment fails to fulfill
domestic practice or policy.”). See also authorities cited supra note 85 for the
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have enforced foreign judgments even though they were based on
causes of action that would be prohibited, or at least not be
recognized, in the enforcement forum.91
The 2005 revision to the Uniform Act adds two new
discretionary grounds for non-recognition: “[T]he judgment was
rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the
integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment,” and
“the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the
judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due
process of law.”92 The 2005 Act also clarifies two areas that have
troubled courts when applying the 1962 Act. First, the 2005 Act
broadens the focus of the public policy exception by providing that
a foreign judgment need not be recognized if “the . . . judgment or
the [cause of action] . . . on which the . . . judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United
States.”93 Second, it specifies that the party resisting recognition
has the burden of establishing that offered ground for
nonrecognition exists within the Act.94
The UFMJRA applies only to foreign judgments granting or
denying recovery of a sum of money.95 However, a judgment for a
“fine or other penalty” is specifically excluded.96 This phrase is not
heightened level and narrowness by which courts interpret the public policy
exception.
91 See, e.g., Ramon, 169 F.3d at 317 (recognizing Mexican judgment on
promissory note even though interest charged was usurious under Texas law);
Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 691–92 (7th Cir. 1987)
(enforcing Belgian judgment awarding prejudgment interest even though
inappropriate under Illinois law); Somportex, 453 F.2d at 443 (enforcing British
judgment that included damages for loss of good will and attorney fees even
though Pennsylvania law did not allow recovery for loss of good will or attorney
fees); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 632, 643–44 (N.D. Tex. 2001)
(recognizing English judgment despite apparent conflict with Texas law that
condemns cognovit judgments), aff’d, 303 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002). See Brand, supra
note 55, at 275–76 nn.86–88 (collecting cases); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation,
Construction and Application of Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 88
A.L.R. FED. 5th 545, 615–20 (2001 and Supp. 2009) (reviewing cases).
92 UFMJRA, §§ 4(c)(7) & (8), 13 U.L.A. 46 (2002).
93 Id. § 4(c)(3) (emphasis added). The same stringent test for finding a public
policy violation applied by courts interpreting the 1962 Act applies to the revised
Act. Id. § 4, cmt. 8. See supra notes 84–91 and accompanying text (addressing the
public policy exception under the UFMJRA).
94 Id. § 4(d).
95 Id. § 1(2).
96 Id. § 1(2). A judgment for taxes or for support in domestic relations matters
is also excluded from coverage. Id.
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defined in the UFMJRA or its 2005 revision but may mean that a
foreign judgment for punitive damages obtained by a private
litigant is not covered, although enforcement may still be possible
on the basis of comity.97 However, the fact that a foreign money
judgment includes attorney fees and costs does not necessarily
mean that judgment is a penalty or is contrary to the public policy
of the enforcement forum.98
Likewise, a foreign judgment granting non-monetary relief,
such as specific performance or an injunction, is not within the
scope of the UFMJRA.99 However, several courts have recognized
and enforced non-monetary judgments based on comity
principles.100

97 See UFMJRA § 7 (providing that the “Act does not prevent the recognition
of a foreign judgment in situations not covered by this Act.”); Heiser, Forum Non
Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation, supra note 16, at 649–53 (discussing
enforcement of foreign judgments for punitive damages).
98 See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,
443 (3d Cir. 1971) (enforcing British judgment including attorney fees even though
Pennsylvania law did not allow recovery of attorney fees); ERBE Elektromedizin
GmbH v. Canady, 545 F. Supp. 2d 491 (W.D.Pa. 2008) (holding foreign judgment
for attorney fees was not a penalty and not repugnant to public policy even
though attorney fees not recoverable under Pennsylvania or federal law);
Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 585 N.E.2d 321, 323 (Mass. 1992) (enforcing
Canadian judgment for costs awarded based on percentage of amount in issue
and not on actual costs).
99 See UFMJA § 1(2) (restricting foreign judgments to include only judgments
of “a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money”).
100 See, e.g., Siko Ventures v. Argyll Equities, No. SA-05-CA-100-OG, 2005 WL
2233205, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2005) (observing that “Texas courts have
repeatedly recognized and enforced . . . sister-state judgments under comity
principles”); Nahar v. Nahar, 656 So. 2d 225, 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(recognizing and enforcing decree of Aruban court ordering transfer of decedent’s
Florida bank accounts to Aruba to be disposed of according to Dutch law);
Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing and
enforcing temporary injunction of Guatemalan court freezing funds in
defendant’s Florida bank accounts). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 102 cmt. g (1971) (indicating that a foreign nation decree that orders or
enjoins an act will be enforced provided enforcement is necessary to effectuate the
decree and will not impose an undue burden upon the American court, provided
the decree is consistent with fundamental principles of justice).
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THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS

3.1. The Scope of the Hague Convention
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements sets
forth uniform international rules for enforcing exclusive choice of
court commercial transactions agreements between parties, and for
the recognition and enforcement of judgments resulting from
proceedings based on such agreements.101 The scope of this
Convention is limited in several important ways. First, the
Convention applies only in “international cases.”102 For purposes
of jurisdiction, a case is an “international case” unless the parties
are residents of the same Contracting State and the dispute is
connected only with that State.103
Second, the Convention applies only to “exclusive choice of
court agreements.”104 An “exclusive choice of court agreement” is
one that designates one or more courts of one Contracting State to
the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts.105
Significantly, an agreement that designates one or more courts of
one Contracting State is deemed exclusive unless the parties have
expressly provided otherwise.106
Third, the Convention applies only to “agreements concluded
in civil or commercial matters.”107 It expressly does not apply to
choice of court agreements in consumer or employment
contracts.108 Moreover, several additional matters are specifically
101 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, preamble (creating rules that would
“promote international trade and investment through enhanced judicial cooperation”).
102 Id. arts. 1(2), (3).
103 Id. art. 1(2).
104 Id. arts. 1, 3 & 22. However, Article 22 permits Contracting States through
reciprocal declarations to extend the recognition and enforcement provisions of
the Convention to non-exclusive choice of court agreements. See also TREVOR C.
HARTLEY & MASOTO DOGAUCHI, EXPLANATORY REPORT: CONVENTION OF 30 JUNE
2005 ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS ¶¶240–255 (2007) [hereinafter
EXPLANATORY REPORT] (discussing the provisions of Article 22. This authoritative
EXPLANATORY REPORT, contains article-by-article commentary reflecting the views
of the Diplomatic Session which adopted the Convention), http://www
.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.publications&dtid=3&cid=98.
105 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. (3)(a).
106 Id. art. 3(b).
107 Id. art. 1(1).
108 Id. art. 2(1).
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excluded from coverage, including various family law matters,
anti-trust claims, and most intellectual property (except copyright)
matters.109 There is one particularly significant exclusion: the
Convention does not apply to personal injury claims “brought by
or on behalf of natural persons.”110
3.2. Jurisdiction of the Chosen Court and the Obligations of the Court
Not Chosen
Article 3 of the Convention defines an “exclusive choice of
court agreement” to mean a written agreement that designates, for
the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in
connection with a particular legal relationship, “the courts of one
Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one Contracting
State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts.”111
Articles 5 and 6 then set forth the Convention’s basic rules with
respect to the jurisdiction of the court chosen in an exclusive choice
of court agreement, as well as the obligations of a court not chosen.
Article 5(1) provides that the court of a Contracting State
designated in an exclusive agreement “shall have jurisdiction to
decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless the
agreement is null and void under the law of that State.”112 Most
significantly, under Article 5(2), the chosen court “shall not decline
to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be
decided in a court of another State.”113 The intent of this language
is clear: the chosen court must hear the case unless the agreement
is “null and void,” and has no discretion to dismiss or stay the
proceedings under the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens.114
“The ’null and void’ provision is the only generally applicable
exception to the rule that the chosen court must hear the case.”115
109 Id. art. 2(2). See also id. art. 2(5) (stating that proceedings in which a
country or a government agency is a party are not necessarily excluded from the
scope of the Convention). But see id. art. 2(6) (discussing how the Convention
does not affect the sovereign immunity of States or international organizations).
110 Id. art. 2(2)(j).
111 Id. art. 3(a).
112 Id. art. 5(1).
113 Id. art. 5(2).
114 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶132–34, at 44 (discussing
Article 5(2)’s intent to preclude the chosen court from resorting to forum non
conveniens or lis pendens).
115 Id. ¶125, at 43.
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The phrase “null and void” is not defined by the Convention, but
apparently refers to generally recognized grounds for invalidating
an agreement such as fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, duress,
and lack of capacity.116 However, the Convention does not
authorize the chosen court to refuse to enforce a choice of court
agreement where enforcement would be contrary to the public
policy of the State of the chosen court.117
Article 5 of the Convention also contains two specific
exceptions to the general rule that the designated court shall not
decline jurisdiction. Article 5(3)(a) states that the general rule of
Article 5(1) and 5(2) does “not affect rules on jurisdiction related to
subject matter or to the value of the claim;” and Article 5(3)(b)
provides that the general rule shall not affect rules “on the internal
allocation of jurisdiction among the courts of a Contracting
State.”118 However, Article 5(3)(b) states, “where the chosen court
has discretion as to whether transfer a case” from one court to
another within the Contracting State, “due consideration should be
given to the choice of the parties.”119 As will be explained below,
these two exceptions complicate analysis of the Convention’s
impact on the doctrines of forum non conveniens, transfer of venue
from one federal district court to another, and removal from state
to federal court.120
Article 6 of the Convention specifies the obligations of a court
of a Contracting State other than the court chosen by an exclusive
choice of court agreement. That court must suspend or dismiss the
proceedings to which the agreement applies unless one of five
narrow exceptions applies. These include: that “the agreement is
null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court,” that
giving effect to the agreement would be “manifestly contrary to the
public policy of the State of the court seised,” or that “the chosen
See id. ¶126 (discussing the meaning of Article 3(c)).
In contrast, the Convention does provide a public policy exception to the
general obligation of a court not chosen to decline to hear the case, and to the
general rule of recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by the chosen
court. Hague Convention, supra note 1, arts. 6(c), 9(e). See infra notes 122, 131–32
and accompanying text (discussing this exception).
118 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(3)(a)–(b).
119 Id. art. 5(3)(b).
120 See infra notes 163–75 and accompanying text (examining how these two
exceptions are involved in the analysis of the Convention’s impact on the
doctrines of forum non conveniens, transfer of venue, and removal to federal
court).
116
117
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court has decided not to hear the case” on some basis consistent
with the Convention.121 This last exception applies, for example,
when a choice of court agreement refers to a specific court in a
Contracting State but that court transfers the action to another
court in the same state based on the internal allocation of
jurisdiction among the courts of that state.122
In such
circumstances, Article 6 does not preclude the transferee court, or
any other court, from hearing the case.123
3.3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
The Hague Convention also contains provisions regarding
recognition and enforcement of certain judgments.124 The general
rule, stated in Article 8, is that a judgment given by a court in a
Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court
agreement must be recognized and enforced in other Contracting
States.125 “Recognition or enforcement may be refused only on the
grounds specified in [the] Convention.”126 The enforcing court is
prohibited from reviewing the merits of the judgment, except as
necessary to determine whether a ground for nonrecognition
applies, and is bound by the findings of fact on which the court of
origin based it jurisdiction under the Convention.127 However, a

121 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 6(a), (c), (e). See also EXPLANATORY
REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶141–59, at 46–49 (providing an excellent discussion of
this general obligation and the five specific exceptions).
122 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶155–59, at 48–49 (discussing
this exception and providing examples).
123 See id. (discussing this exception and providing examples). This exception
recognizes that in order to avoid a denial of justice, some court must be available
to hear the case. Id. ¶155, at 48.
124 Hague Convention, supra note 1, arts. 8–12, 22. “Recognition” means the
court so requested “gives effect to the determination of the legal rights and
obligations made by the court of origin.” EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104,
¶170, at 51. “Enforcement” means the application of the legal procedures of the
court so requested to ensure that the defendant obeys the court of origin’s
judgment. Id.
125 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(1). In addition, Article 22 permits
Contracting States, through reciprocal declarations, to extend the recognition and
enforcement provisions of the Convention to non-exclusive choice of court
agreements. See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶240–55, at 66–69
(discussing the provisions of Article 22).
126 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
127 Id. art. 8(2) (binding the reviewing court to the court of origin’s findings
on jurisdiction “unless the judgment was given by default”).
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judgment will be recognized and enforced only if it is in effect and
enforceable in the “State of origin.”128
All of the exceptions to recognition and enforcement specified
in the Convention are discretionary.129 Consequently, even where
one or more exceptions apply, the Convention does not preclude
recognition and enforcement.130
The specific exceptions to
recognition and enforcement stated in Article 9 include: the
agreement was “null and void” under the law of the chosen State,
unless the chosen court has determined that the agreement is valid;
the defendant did not receive proper notice; the judgment was
obtained through fraud or is inconsistent with another judgment;
or where recognition and enforcement would be “manifestly
incompatible with the public policy of the requested State,
including situations where the specific proceedings leading to the
judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of
procedural fairness of that State.”131 This last exception is intended
to be very narrow, referring only to the most basic norms and
principles of the enforcement state.132
The Convention’s recognition and enforcement provisions also
apply to a judgment given by a court in a Contracting State after a
transfer of the case from the chosen court as permitted by Article
5(3).133 However, where the chosen court had discretion as to
whether to transfer the case to another court, recognition and
enforcement may be refused against a party who objected to the
transfer in a timely manner in the state of origin.134 For example,
where the case was commenced by the plaintiff in the chosen
federal district court but was transferred over plaintiff’s objection
to another federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a

128 Id. art. 8(3). Recognition and enforcement may be postponed or refused if
the judgment is subject to review in the country of origin. Id. art. 8(4).
129 See id. arts. 8(1), 8(5), 9–11 (providing various grounds under which
recognition and enforcement “may” be refused).
130 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶182, at 53 (noting that when an
exception applies, the Convention does not require recognition and enforcement
of the judgment, but “does not preclude [the enforcing court] from doing so”).
131 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(a), (c)–(e).
132 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶151–53, 189–90 (noting that
the exception is intended to apply to those judgments that would
“axiomatic[ally]” be contrary to public policy).
133 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(5). For discussion of the transfer
provisions of Article 5(3), see supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
134 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(5).
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court in another Contracting State need not recognize a judgment
against the plaintiff.135
The Convention’s enforcement provisions clearly apply to
foreign judgments denying or awarding money damages.136
However, Article 11 provides that recognition or enforcement of a
money judgment may be refused if, and to the extent that, the
damages do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm
suffered, “including exemplary or punitive damages.”137
However, the enforcing court must take into account whether and
to what extent the damages awarded serve to cover costs and
expenses related to the proceedings.138
Interestingly, the Convention’s enforcement provisions are not
expressly limited to foreign judgments for money damages. This
means that these provisions may also apply to a non-monetary
judgment, such as one for specific performance or injunctive
relief.139 However, a Contracting State is be obliged to enforce a
non-monetary remedy that is not available under its own law.140
4.

THE IMPACT OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT
AGREEMENTS ON COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES
4.1. The Hague Convention Preempts Contrary Domestic Law

By its terms, the Hague Convention “shall apply in
international cases to exclusive choice of court agreements
concluded in civil or commercial matters.”141 The Convention also
contains similar mandatory language in most of its key provisions.
135 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶175–81 (providing examples
and discussing various applications of Article 8(5)).
136 See id. ¶¶ 203–05 (providing a discussion of the structure and purpose of
Article 11 concerning damages).
137 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(1). See EXPLANATORY REPORT,
supra note 104, ¶¶ 203–05 (identifying the concerns and drafting history that
underlie the Article’s provisions).
138 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
139 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶89, 164, n.201 (demonstrating
together that a Contracting State must recognize an applicable non-monetary
judgment of another Contracting State to the best of its ability).
140 See id. ¶89 (explaining that enforcing courts, which are not required to
grant remedies that are unavailable under their own laws, should apply the
internal enforcement measures available to them that give the foreign judgment
the truest effect).
141 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
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For example, when delineating the obligations of the contractually
chosen court and of courts not chosen, the Convention states that
the court designated in an exclusive agreement “shall have
jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement applies,”
and a court not chosen “shall suspend or dismiss proceedings to
which an exclusive agreement applies.”142
Likewise, when
addressing recognition of foreign judgments, the Convention states
that such judgments “shall be recognized and enforced” unless a
specified exception applies.143
The mandatory nature of this treaty means that, by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, its standards preempt
inconsistent state and federal law in cases where the Convention
applies.144
Consequently, in such cases, the Convention’s
directives regarding enforcement of choice of court agreements
and recognition of judgments will prevail over contrary rules
followed by U.S. courts in cases outside the scope of the
Convention.
4.2. The Hague Convention and Enforcement of Forum Selection
Clauses in U.S. Courts
As discussed previously, the vast majority of courts in the
United States will enforce a choice of court agreement, unless the
resisting party shows that enforcement would be unreasonable and
unjust.145 Enforcement will be denied only when the agreement is
invalid based on contract formation principles, is contrary to the
public policy of the forum, or designates a forum that is so gravely
inconvenient that it will effectively deprive a party of a meaningful
day in court.146 This standard is essentially the same as the one set

Id. arts. 5(1), 6.
Id. art. 8(1).
144 See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699
(1988) (indicating that, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, the Hague Service
Convention preempts inconsistent methods of service of process prescribed by
state law).
145 See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text (discussing the willingness of
courts in the United States to enforce choice of courts agreements).
146 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why United
States courts might decide against enforcing choice of court agreements).
142
143
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forth in Article 6 of the Hague Convention.147 However, there are
some minor differences.
The Convention does not explicitly provide any exception to
enforcement based on inconvenience, “grave” or otherwise.148
However, Article 6 authorizes the court not chosen to exercise
jurisdiction where giving effect to the choice of court agreement
would lead to a “manifest injustice.”149 This broad reference would
seem to encompass those exceptional circumstances where the
inconveniences associated with the chosen forum are so profound
that they will effectively deprive a party of a meaningful day in
court.150 In addition, the Convention does not authorize an
exception to enforcement of a choice of court agreement where
doing so would be contrary to the public policy of the state of the
chosen court.151 Some jurisdictions within the United States do
recognize these grounds for non-enforcement, although they are
infrequently invoked.152
Although nearly every jurisdiction in the United States has
adopted standards similar to those in the Convention, a few states
treat forum selection clauses less favorably.153 When these state
laws conflict with the Hague Convention, the Convention’s
provisions will prevail.154 The most significant difference between
the Convention and domestic law does not involve enforcement

147 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 6. See supra notes 112–17, 121 and
accompanying text (discussing circumstances under which the Hague Convention
does not require that a choice of court decision be enforced).
148 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 6 (lacking an explicit
inconvenience exception).
149 Id. art. 6(c).
150 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶151–53, at 48 (discussing the
“two limbs” of Article 6(c)).
151 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that although the
Convention does not allow a chosen court to refuse to enforce a choice of court
agreement which would be contrary to its public policy, the Convention does
provide public policy exceptions to the general obligation of the court not chosen
to decline to hear a case, and to the general rule of recognition and enforcement of
judgments rendered by the chosen court).
152 See, e.g., Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 733 P.2d 1143 (Idaho
1989) (determining the forum selection clause in the contract violated the public
policy of the State of Florida).
153 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (discussing state laws
disfavoring forum selection clauses).
154 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (addressing the preemptive
effect of the Convention).
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standards but rather the interpretation of an otherwise enforceable
agreement.
The Convention states that a choice of court agreement which
designates the courts of one Contracting State, or one or more
specific courts of one contacting state, “shall be deemed to be
exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise.”155
This presumption of exclusivity conflicts with the interpretative
approach taken by many U.S. courts, which presume against
exclusivity.156 The Convention preempts this domestic approach in
cases within the treaty’s scope.
4.3.

The Hague Convention and Forum Non Conveniens

The Hague Convention has a clear impact on the doctrine of
forum non conveniens applied in U.S. courts. As explained above,
an important general rule of the Hague Convention is that the
court designated as the exclusive forum in a valid choice of court
agreement is precluded from dismissing or staying an action based
on forum non conveniens.157 But this general rule is subject to so
many exceptions that its impact on the use of forum non
conveniens by courts in the United States is considerably less than
first appears.
The most frequent, and the most controversial, use of forum
non conveniens is in transnational tort cases—often product
liability actions—brought by foreign persons in a U.S. court
seeking recovery of personal injury damages from defendants who
reside in the United States.158 Such personal injury actions are
expressly excluded from the scope of the Convention.159 Likewise,
the Convention specifically excludes other types of cases where
forum non conveniens motions are likely, including tort actions for
damage to tangible property that do not arise from contractual
155 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(b). See also EXPLANATORY REPORT,
supra note 104, ¶¶ 102–109 (discussing the manner in which the exclusivity of a
choice of court agreement is interpreted under the Convention and providing
examples).
156 See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (discussing the reluctance of
some courts in the United States to read choice of court agreements as exclusive).
157 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text (detailing the Hague
Convention’s limits on forum non conveniens).
158 See Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation, supra note 16,
at 609–11, 618–21 (collecting authorities and discussing the frequent use of forum
non conveniens in transnational tort litigation).
159 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(2)(j).
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relationships, anti-trust claims, marine pollution claims, and many
actions involving intellectual property rights (other than copyright
and related rights).160
However, with respect to those commercial and civil matters
that do come within the scope of the Convention, an action
commenced in a U.S. court pursuant to an exclusive choice of court
agreement cannot be dismissed or stayed based on forum non
conveniens if the alternative forum is in another country.161 This is
certainly a significant change in the availability of the common law
doctrine. Whether a forum non conveniens dismissal is permitted
when the alternative forum is in another state within the United
States depends on the description of the forum designated in an
exclusive choice of court agreement.162 The same analysis applies
to motions to transfer venue from one federal district court to
another pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), which is discussed below.
4.4. The Hague Convention and Federal Court Transfer of Venue
The Hague Convention recognizes that some signatory
countries may not have unified legal systems.163 For example, the
United States is comprised of a number of states with different
systems of law and, in addition, a separate federal court system
with limited subject matter jurisdiction. The Convention addresses
non-unified legal systems by directing that “any reference to the
court or courts of a State shall be construed as referring, where
appropriate, to the court or courts in the relevant territorial
unit.”164 Consequently, if an exclusive choice of court agreement
designates “the courts of the State of California,” the word “State”
in Article 5(2) would refer to California and not to the United
States, and the California state court would be precluded under

160 Id. art 2(2). See generally CASAD & RICHMAN, JURISDICTION, supra note 4, § 14 (discussing the various types of cases in which forum non conveniens motions
are granted).
161 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(2). See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra
note 104, ¶¶15, 107, 127–140 (discussing “non-unified” legal systems and the
limitations Article 5 places on a court’s ability to decline jurisdiction).
162 See infra notes 163–168 and accompanying text (discussing interaction
between Hague Convention and U.S. state and federal court systems).
163 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 25 (describing application of
Convention to Contracting States with non-unified legal systems).
164 Id. art. 25(1)(c).
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Article 5(2) from declining jurisdiction in favor of a court in
another U.S. state.165
However, as discussed previously, pursuant to the exception
stated in Article 5(3)(b), the general rule of Article 5(2) does “not
affect rules—on the internal allocation of jurisdiction among the
courts of a Contracting State.”166 Therefore, if an exclusive
agreement designates “the Superior Court of San Diego, State of
California,” that state court would not be precluded from
transferring the case to another state court within California based
on notions of convenience or proper venue.167 If the exclusive
agreement generally designates “a court located within the United
States” and an action is commenced in a California state court, that
court would not be precluded from dismissing the action based on
forum non conveniens where the alternative forum is in another
state within the United States, such as Illinois or Florida.168
Likewise, if an exclusive agreement designates “the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California,” that
federal court would not be precluded from transferring the case to
another federal district court located in another state pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).169 In this context, the word “State” in Article
5(2) is properly construed to refer to the United States, and Article
5(3)(b) would therefore permit a discretionary transfer of venue to
another federal district court within the United States, for example,
to the Southern District of New York or the Western District of
Texas.
The only limitation imposed by Article 5(3)(b) on this internal
allocation of jurisdiction is, where the chosen state has discretion as
to whether to transfer a case, that “due consideration should be
given to the choice of the parties.”170 This “due consideration” of
the parties’ choice of forum is essentially the same vague standard
165 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶128–34 (discussing the
meaning of the term “state” in the Convention, especially as it relates to countries
containing several territorial units).
166 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(3)(b). See supra text accompanying
notes 118–19 (parsing Hague Convention Article 5 language on allocation of
jurisdiction between State’s domestic court systems).
167 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶139–40 (noting, with
examples, that the Convention allows for internal allocation rules).
168 See id. ¶¶ 130–31 (discussing similar examples).
169 See id. ¶¶ 131, 139–40 (discussing a similar example as well as the
Convention’s treatment of internal allocation rules).
170 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(3)(b).
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endorsed in Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp., where the Supreme
Court ruled that an exclusive choice of court agreement did not
preclude a federal court transfer of venue based on convenience
pursuant to section 1404(a).171 Therefore, the Hague Convention
does not alter the ability of a federal district court to transfer venue
to a district court in another state pursuant to section 1404(a).172
4.5. The Hague Convention and Removal Jurisdiction
The Hague Convention does not appear to preclude a
defendant from removing a case from state court to federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Although the text of the Convention
is not clear on this issue, the “internal allocation of jurisdiction”
and the “transfer” language in Article 5(3)(b) may also refer to
removal of jurisdiction.173 Moreover, Article 5(3)(a) states that the
general rule of Article 5(2) does not affect the Contracting State’s
internal laws “on jurisdiction related to subject matter.”174
Therefore, if an exclusive choice of court agreement designates “the
state courts of California,” the Convention would not preclude
removal of an action from a California Superior Court to the
appropriate U.S. District Court in California.175 However, as
discussed previously, although the Convention does not preclude

171 See supra text accompanying notes 39–43 (discussing Stewart Org. v.
Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22, 28–31 (1988)).
172 Although not precluded by the Convention, in some circumstances a
section 1404(a) transfer may affect the obligations under Article 6 of a court not
chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement, and the recognition and
enforcement of a judgment given by the transferee court under Article 8. See
Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 6(e) (providing that a court in a Contracting
State other than the chosen court is not precluded from hearing a case where “the
chosen court has decided not to hear the case”); id. art. 8(5) (providing that
recognition or enforcement may be refused against a party who objected to a
discretionary transfer in a timely manner); EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104,
¶¶156–58, 175–81 (discussing the meaning of Articles 6(e) and 8(5)); See also supra
notes 121–23, 133–35 and accompanying text (discussing those Articles as they
relate to cases transferred under internal allocation rules).
173 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶ 135–40, n.176 (discussing the
meaning of Articles 5(3)(a) and (b)).
174 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(3)(a).
175 For the same reason, an exclusive choice of court agreement that
designates a court with limited jurisdiction, such as a United States district court,
will not preclude dismissal if the chosen court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
under the relevant internal laws. See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, at 45,
¶¶136–39 (discussing the meaning of subject matter jurisdiction in federated
States such as the United States and application of the Convention to those states).
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removal, the federal court would enforce the exclusive agreement
and remand the action back to state court.176
4.6. The Hague Convention and Recognition of Judgments
The rules for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
contained in the Hague Convention are remarkably similar to
those set forth in the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act of 1962 (UFMJRA) and its 2005 revision, the
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.
Like the UFMJRA, the Convention embodies the general rule that
judgments within its scope must be recognized and enforced.177
For the most part, the authorized grounds for nonrecognition are
the same in both sources. However, as discussed below, there are
a few differences.
Unlike the UFMJRA, which contains both mandatory and nonmandatory exceptions to recognition and enforcement, all the
exceptions authorized by the Convention are discretionary. The
UFMJRA mandates nonrecognition if the judgment was rendered
under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or
procedures compatible with fundamental due process, or if the
foreign court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction.178 The
Convention permits nonrecognition on similar grounds, but does
not require it.179 Although this difference in the two laws appears
important, its impact will likely be quite limited. A court in the
United States is unlikely to exercise its discretion in favor of
recognition or enforcement of a judgment rendered by a foreign
legal system whose courts are not impartial or whose procedures
violate fundamental notions of due process.

176 See supra text accompanying notes 48–54 (discussing U.S. Courts of
Appeals’ decisions to enforce such forum selection clauses).
177 Of course, the provisions in the Hague Convention apply only where
recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by one Contracting State is
sought in another Contracting State, whereas the provisions of the UFMJRA apply
to a money judgment rendered by any foreign country. See supra text
accompanying notes 62–69, 124 (discussing the UFMJRA).
178 See
supra text accompanying notes 70–74 (discussing UFMJRA
requirements in greater detail).
179 See supra text accompanying notes 129–30 (noting that nonrecognition
under the Convention is discretionary).
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The Public Policy Exception

There are some differences between the language of the “public
policy” exception in the Convention and the same exception in the
UFMJRA. Under Article 9(e) of the Convention, recognition or
enforcement may be refused if the foreign judgment would be
“manifestly incompatible” with the public policy of the
enforcement state, whereas section 4(b) of the UFMJRA more
narrowly permits nonrecognition if the “cause of action” on which
the judgment is based is repugnant to public policy.180
This difference in the public policy exceptions means that in
some instances a court in the United States may refuse to enforce a
foreign judgment under the Convention where it would not have
had the discretion to do so if the UFMJRA applied.181 In those
states that narrowly focus on the “cause of action,” the Convention
will preempt state law and require the enforcing court to focus
more broadly on whether the judgment itself is repugnant to
public policy. However, because the public policy exception in
both laws is discretionary and very narrow, preemption by the
Convention may have little impact. Moreover, this difference does
not even exist in those states that have adopted the 2005 version of
the uniform Act, whose public policy exception applies to the
judgment itself as well as to the cause of action on which that
judgment is based.182
The Hague Convention also permits nonrecognition of a
foreign judgment given by a court other than the chosen court after
a discretionary transfer within the Contracting State, where
recognition or enforcement is sought against a party who objected
to the transfer.183 This exception is not available under the
UFMJRA. However, even in those few cases where the terms of
the Convention’s exception are satisfied, a court in the United
States is unlikely to exercise its discretion to deny recognition
unless the transferee court in the foreign country was so seriously
inconvenient, in comparison to the chosen court, that the transfer
180 See supra notes 84–88 (discussing the UFMJRA’s position on the public
policy exception); supra text accompanying notes 131–32 (discussing the
Convention’s public policy exception) and accompanying text.
181 See id. (discussing generally the UFMJRA’s and Convention’s public policy
exception).
182 See supra text accompanying note 93 (discussing the 2005 Act).
183 See supra text accompanying notes 133–35 (discussing this permitted
nonrecognition in greater detail).
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denied the losing (and objecting) party a meaningful day in court.
When such serious inconvenience exists, a court might then
exercise its discretion and deny recognition, perhaps because the
specific proceedings leading to the judgment were also
fundamentally unfair within the meaning of the Convention.184
4.6.2.

Enforcement of Judgments for Non-Monetary Relief

An interesting area of apparent conflict involves recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments for non-monetary relief,
such as specific performance or an injunction. Such judgments
appear to be subject to the Convention’s general rule that foreign
judgments shall be recognized and enforced unless some specified
exception applies.185 In contrast, the general approach followed by
courts in the United States is that non-monetary judgments may be
enforced as a matter of international comity.186 Under this
approach, a court may be quite willing to recognize a non-monetary
judgment for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel, but
the same court may be unwilling to enforce the judgment as its own
without further consideration of the appropriateness of such
relief.187
Whether this potential conflict between treatment of nonmonetary judgments under the treaty and domestic law proves
significant depends on how courts interpret the Convention. A
reasonable interpretation is that the “public policy” exception to
mandatory enforcement applies because this issue is of

184 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(e) (providing that recognition
could be refused in such a situation).
185 See supra text accompanying notes 139–40 (discussing that because the
Convention is not expressly limited to monetary judgments, it seems to apply to
non-monetary judgments as well).
186 See supra note 100 (listing cases where non-monetary judgments were
enforced in the United States).
187 See, e.g., Pilkington Bros. v. AFG Industries Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1039, 1040
(D. Del. 1984) (refusing to issue a preliminary injunction based solely on a foreign
interim injunction); Yoder v. Yoder, 330 A.2d 825, 828 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974)
(holding that although a Mexican divorce decree was enforceable under comity, it
was not necessary for the court to adopt the decree as its own). Cf. Baker v.
General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234–36 (1998) (distinguishing between
recognition of sister-state judgment for injunctive relief for purposes of claim and
issue preclusion, and direct enforcement of an injunction entered by another
state).
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fundamental importance to the enforcement state.188 Another is
that the Convention’s enforcement provisions are not intended to
require a Contracting State to enforce a non-monetary remedy if
this is not possible under its legal system.189 Courts in the United
States will likely adopt one of these interpretations influenced,
perhaps, by the uncertainty in domestic law as to whether the Full
Faith and Credit Clause requires enforcement of a sister-state
judgment for non-monetary relief.190
4.6.3.

Reciprocity

Some jurisdictions have added a reciprocity requirement to
their version of the UFMJRA.191 A court in one of these states will
not recognize a judgment rendered by a court in a foreign country
unless that country would recognize a similar judgment of the
state.192 The Hague Convention establishes reciprocal recognition
of foreign judgments rendered pursuant to an exclusive choice of
court agreement, and therefore, may make the reciprocity
requirement irrelevant in cases where the Convention applies.193
To the extent that a state still refuses to recognize a foreign
judgment covered by the Convention because the rendering
country that gave the judgment will not recognize other judgments
that are outside the scope of the Convention, the reciprocity
requirement must yield to the Convention.
188 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(e) (providing for the public
policy exception); supra text accompanying notes 131–32 (discussing the public
policy exception).
189 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, at 37, ¶ 89 n.201, (discussing
history and intent of provisions regarding enforcement of judgments for nonmonetary relief).
190 See Baker, 522 U.S. at 234–36 (1998) (discussing the enforcement of sisterstate judgments for injunctive relief under the Full Faith and Credit Clause); see
generally Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV.
747 (1998) (examining enforcement of sister-state judgments for equitable relief
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
191 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 55.605(2)(g) (2009) (providing that a “foreign judgment
need not be recognized if: The foreign jurisdiction . . . would not give recognition
to a similar judgment rendered in this state.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 235, §
23A, ¶3(7) (West 2009) (“A foreign judgment shall not be recognized if . . .
judgments of this state are not recognized in the courts of the foreign state.”); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(7) (Vernon 2009) (providing similarly).
192 See supra text accompanying note 190 (discussing the enforcement of
sister-state judgments for injunctive relief under the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
193 See supra text accompanying notes 124–27 (discussing the Convention’s
requirements of recognition).
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There is one final observation regarding the impact of the
Hague Convention on domestic recognition and enforcement laws.
This Article has treated the UFMJRA or its 2005 revision as setting
forth the relevant standards with respect to whether a court in the
United States will enforce a foreign judgment. However, some
states have not enacted statutes implementing the UFMJRA and its
2005 revision, and may not have adopted similar common law
standards.194 To the extent that a state has recognition and
enforcement rules that are inconsistent with those contained in the
Convention, the treaty’s standards will prevail in cases where it
applies.
5.

CONCLUSION

Where the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
applies, its standards will preempt contrary federal and state law.
Despite this, in most cases, the Convention should have little
impact on the enforcement of forum selection clauses and on the
doctrines of forum non conveniens, transfer of venue, removal and
remand, and recognition of foreign judgments in courts in the
United States. However, in some areas, the Convention will
require significant changes in domestic law.
One such area involves the important question of whether an
otherwise enforceable choice of court agreement is exclusive, and
therefore, covered by the Convention, or nonexclusive, and thus,
outside the scope of the Convention. The Convention deems many
agreements to be exclusive that would be interpreted as
nonexclusive by many courts when applying domestic law. Courts
in the United States must replace such domestic law with the
Convention’s presumption that an agreement is exclusive unless
the parties have expressly stated otherwise. And, of course, to the
extent that the Convention’s standards conflict with the laws of
those few states that restrict the enforcement of choice of court
agreements, the standards of the Convention will prevail.
Another area involves forum non conveniens. In some
circumstances, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements precludes a court in the United States from declining
jurisdiction based on the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens. This is a noteworthy achievement. However, these
194 See supra text accompanying notes 62–65 (providing the number of states
that have enacted the UFMJRA or its 2005 version).
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circumstances are limited to exclusive choice of court agreements
in “international cases” that designate a court in the United States
in “civil and commercial matters,” within the meaning of the
Convention. The Convention excludes from its coverage several
types of actions in which forum non conveniens is typically, and
successfully, invoked by defendants. Consequently, that common
law doctrine will continue to play an important role in
transnational litigation in courts in the United States.
Likewise, the Hague Convention will have little or no impact
on how the federal courts in the United States treat exclusive
choice of court agreements in the context of motions to transfer
venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), or of motions to remand
after removal from state court to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §
1441 and § 1447. The Convention does not interfere with such
internal allocations of jurisdiction within a country with a nonunified legal system, such as the United States.
Finally, with respect to recognition and enforcement of money
judgments rendered by courts in other Contracting States, the
standards set forth in the Convention are remarkably similar to
those already in effect in a majority of states. There are some
differences, but most are not very significant. Therefore, the
Convention’s impact in this area, as in the others discussed above,
should require few changes in the domestic law.
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